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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA ANN-MELVILLE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
SAMUEL G. MEL VILLE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
9882 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is action by plaintiff against defendant for di-
vorce, child custody, child support, alimony, attorney's 
fees, and distribution of property, wherein defendant 
filed a counterclaim for divorce and property settle-
ment. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. From a judgment 
awarding plaintiff a divorce, $50 per month child support 
money, $50 per month alimony, awarding plaintiff the 
automobile, furniture and household furnishings of the 
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parties (except one 36-piece crystal set and one record 
cabinet), $400 attorney's fees, costs, $597.75 arrears in 
alimony and child support, and ordering defendant to 
pay $65 to the University of Utah and $14.49 to the Utah 
Power and Light Company, and dismissing defendant's 
counterclaim, defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks to have said judgment reversed 
and asks for judgment on his counterclaim awarding de-
fendant a divorce, awarding plaintiff custody of the child 
of the parties, subject to reasonable rights of visitation in 
defendant, awarding plaintiff $50 per month child sup-
port money, awarding plaintiff no alimony or attorney's 
fees, ordering defendant to pay $65 to the University of 
Utah and $14.49 to the Utah Power and Light Com-
pany, awarding plaintiff judgment for $597.75 arrears 
under order pendente lite, and awarding plaintiff the 
following property, to-wit: one fruitwood cabinet, one 
pine secretarial, one love seat, one bedroom set, one crys-
tal chandelier, 4 rosewood chairs, one 36-piece set crys-
tal ware, and one-half interest in said automobile. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
\ In making this statement of facts the numbers in 
parenthesis refer to the pertinent page numbers of the 
record· 
Plaintiff and defendant each sought a divorce on the 
grounds of cruelty causing great mental distress ( 1, 6). 
In addition, plaintiff originally sought $100 per year ali-
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mony, $400 attorney fees, the Mercedes automobile, and 
all of the furniture and household effects of the parties 
( 2). Later plaintiff amended her complaint to ask for $50 
per month alimony ( 13). Plaintiff testified that she did 
this because she needed it because of expenses of the child 
and partly because the case dragged on a bit ( 63) . 
In addition to the divorce, defendant sought a one-
half interest in said automobile ( 6), and certain items of 
furniture, to-wit: one fruitwood record cabinet, one pine 
secretarial, one love seat, one bedroom set, one crystal 
chandelier, four rosewood chairs, and one 36-piece set of 
crystal ware ( 6) . 
The trial court awarded plaintiff the divorce on the 
grounds of mental cruelty, awarded plaintiff custody of 
said child, subject to reasonable rights of visitation, $50 
per month child support, $50 per month permanent ali-
mony, all of the 1956 Mercedes automobile, all of the 
furniture and household furnishings of the parties except 
for said 36-piece crystal set and a record cabinet which 
were awarded to defendant, $400 attorney fees and costs, 
a judgment for $597.75 arrears on order pendente lite 
and ordered defendant to pay bills in the sum of $79.49 
(23, 24). 
Plaintiff and defendant were each bona fide and 
actual residents of Salt Lake County, Utah, for more than 
three months immediately prior to the commencement of 
this action ( 33, 86). 
Plaintiff and defendant were married to each other 
on August 18, 1960, at Salt Lake City, Utah (34); plain-
tiff and defendant were married to each other less than 
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one year and nine months at the time this· action was 
commenced· ( 2) . After the commencement of this action 
one ·child was born as issue of said· marriage, to-wit: 
Michael David ( 34, 65). PI'aintiff was a school teach-
er at the time of marriage ( 62), and during the mar~ 
riage comph~ted the requirements for becoming a librar-
ian ( 62) and was employed as a librarian at the time of 
the trial ( 61 ) . That defendant. was unemployed and· not 
attending college at the time of said marriage ( 34) ~ That 
defendant resumed his schooling at the University ofUtah 
one month after 'said marriage ( 35)-' That defendant at-
tended the University for five quarters continuing through 
the Winter Quarter of 1962 ( 36). At the time of trial 
defendant required about two semesters to complete his 
college work ( 103) . That during the marriage, defendant 
worked at a number of part time and summer jobs, to-
wit: Salt Lake County Hospital, Western Trading, Lith-
ograph Co., Nevada Lodge, Cal-Nev Lodge, Clark Lehm-
ing, University of Utah, and Menlove, Inc. At these jobs, 
defendant earned approximately $1846 ( 107 to 109). 
Plaintiff's gross salary as a librarian is $4200 to $'4298 
per year ( 62) . Plaintiff's beginning salary as school teach-
er was $3600 per year ( 62). Plaintiff's take home pay is 
$288 per month (56). At the time of the trial. defendant 
was living in Los Angeles,· California ( 86), and was em-
ployed by Barker Brothers, Pasadeha, California, as a fur-
niture salesman and decorator (99). His take home pay 
was $250 per month ( 100). Plaintiff testified. (52 to 55) 
that her expenses for herself and the child of the parties 
per month are : 
----------~··'·•~·-
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CHILD 
$ 55.00 · Child care · 
10.00 Doctot bill 
5~00 · Medicine 
20.00 Food 
2·50 Vitamins 
·10.00 Clothing 
5.00 Laundry 
$107.50 
5 
PLAINTIFF 
$ 80.00 Rent· 
2.50 Telephone bill 
4.00 Light bill 
10.00 · Credit Union 
5 .. 00 . Laundry 
5.00 Dry cleaning 
·s.oo Doctor bill 
·25.00· Food 
25.00 Gasoline for automo-
bile 
30.00 Clothing and cosmet-
ics, etc· 
' 5.00 Car insurance 
· 6.00 Automobile taxes 
30.00 Miscellaneous, includ-
ing entertainment 
$232.50 
Plaintiff testified that she felt that $75 is a reasonable 
amount for child support and that $50 a month is rea-
sonable for alimony (56) . 
Defendant testified ( 101 to 103, 122) that his 
monthly expenses ar~: 
DEFENDANT 
$ 60.00 · Rent 
10.00 Bus travel 
80.00 Food and Kitchen equipment 
4.10 Laundry 
3.00 Dry cleaning 
30.00 Clothing 
15.00 Medical 
$202·10 
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Defendant also testified that he had a severe sinus con-
dition and that he required a tonsillectomy and surgery 
on his nose ( 103) . Defendant also testified that he plan-
ned to complete his schooling in California at UCLA and 
that he had no savings for his tuition ( 103). 
The following list sets forth the property belonging 
to the parties together with its value and source ( 104 to 
106, 47 to 49, 30 to 32, 53 and 133): 
PROPERTY VALUE SOURCE 
36-piece crystal set $ 36.00 Purchased by parties and paid 
for by defendant's parents 
Bedroom set 600.00 Gift from defendant's parents 
Boston rocker 25.00 Purchased by parties 
Table lamp 15.00 Gift from defendant's sister 
Kitchen table 15.00 Gift from plaintiff's parents 
Two kitchen chairs 10.00 Purchased by the parties 
Pottery set 60.00 Gift from various people 
China set 60.00 Gift from various people 
Refrigerator 50.00 Purchased by the parties 
Room .divider 15.00 Made by .defendant 
Love seat 75.00 Obtained by defendant 
Two wing back chairs 60.00 Acquired by plaintiff prior 
to marriage 
Inlaid table 60.00 Gift from plaintiff's parents 
Oriental rugs 800.00 Gift from plaintiffs parents 
Marble topped table 60.00 Purchased by parties 
Silver lamp 40.00 Purchased by parties 
Upholstered chair 40.00 Gift from plaintiffs' parents 
Stereo set 80.00 Acquired by plaintiff before 
marriage 
Cabinet 20.00 Gift from defendant's parents 
Pine secretarial 60.00 Gift from defendant's parents 
Kitchen utensils, etc. 100.00 Wedding gifts 
Carpets and misc. wed 
-
ding gifts 100.00 
Crystal chandelier 50.00 Defendant traded a painting 
therefor 
Four rosewood chairs 100.00 Purc~ased by parties 
Mercedes automobile 600.00 Acqmred by both parties 
Total $3131.00 
-------------- --==----
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At the time of trial plaintiff was 26 years old ( 33). 
At the trial, plaintiff's attorney asked her, "Now, Mrs. 
Melville, you have alleged that on or about the 29th day 
of April, 1962, and prior and subsequent thereto, that 
the defendant has treated you cruelly, causing you great 
mental distress?" To which plaintiff answered, "Yes." 
She was then asked, "What are the circumstances that 
brought about this charge?" ( 34). Thereafter, plaintiff 
testified to some difficulties between the parties during 
the first month of marriage because she came home from 
work tired, had to prepare dinner, look beautiful, and 
be ready to go out while defendant was at home all day 
or with his friends, he no~ having started school until it 
started one month later ( 35) ; that the parties did not 
live in happiness and peace during the first year of their 
marriage because defendant was not pursuing the things 
he had allegedly told plaintiff he was going to pursue, 
and because defendant started to smoke several months 
after m(lrriage which bothered plaintiff very much 
( 36, 3 7) . Plaintiff testified that she smoked once during 
the marriage and on that occasion told defendant to smoke 
in the home ( 37). Plaintiff later testified that she had 
smoked several times before in college days ( 61). Plain-
tiff further testified that defendant commenced to drink 
alcoholic beverages and that this bothered plaintiff very 
much ( 37). Plaintiff testified that she drank once during 
the marriage ( 37), and that she did some drinking in col-
lege days ( 60, 61). Plaintiff testified that she seldom 
accompanied defendant evenings (37), that within the 
few months before plaintiff filed for divorce, that de-
fendant was out of the house at least four nights a week 
during a period while defendant was not in school but 
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was working as an interior decorator ( 38) where de-
fendant worked perhaps five hours a day ( 39). This was 
during a time when the parties were having considerable 
difficulty together ( 63), and at a time when plaintiff did 
not enjoy being with defendant ( 63, 64) · Defendant testi-
fied that on these occasions he was working at the Art 
Department ( 129). Plaintiff testified that defendant did 
not provide much money for family use ( 39, 40), that de-
fendant sought the association of other women in that 
many times while plaintiff was with defendant he was 
"directly friendly with some party" and would leave plain-
tiff and take up conversation with other women and that 
plaintiff thought defendant had an unusual interest in 
other women and that defendant talked. to plaintiff of 
other girls, making remarks as to their beauty ( 40, 41 ) . 
Plaintiff was asked, "Did you hear sufficient about 
your husband's activities that it might be construed as a 
reputation that he had?" Plaintiff answered "Yes." De-
fendant objected to this as being immaterial and im-
proper; the court overruled the objection ( 41 ) . Plaintiff 
was then allowed to testify over defendant's objection on 
the same ground that she knew that reputation and that 
the reputation was that defendant was "very flirtatious" 
(41, 42). Plaintiff was then asked, "Did your finding out 
about this reputationthat you have testified of, cause you 
mental concern?" To which plaintiff answered, "Yes, it 
did, very much," and when asked, "Did it cause you 
anguish?" plaintiff answered, "Yes, it did." When asked, 
"Did it cause you to be embarrassed among your friends 
who also knew. of this reputation?" plaintiff answered, 
"Yes, it did" ( 42). 
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Plaintiff further testified that about May 4th or 5th, 
1962, on an occasion when defendant had been drinking 
very heavily, plaintiff attempted to distuss their situation 
but defendant would not discuss the matter with plaintiff 
( 43, 44) . Plaintiff also testified that on an occasion in 
1962 defendant refused to stay home from a guitar ses-
sion when asked to do so by plaintiff, and that defendant 
had told her that she was to ask him no questions and 
that defendant told her this was how he was trying to 
solve his "mental state of mind" ( 45). Plaintiff also testi-
fied that defendant had never requested a divorce from 
plaintiff ( 45). During the marriage plaintiff saw a mar-
riage counselor, and defendant had been under psychiatric 
care ( 46) . Plaintiff testified that defendant had extreme 
sexual difficulties with plaintiff, and plaintiff felt the 
therapy recommended by the psychiatrist was disrupting 
their ma~riage . ( 4 7) . 
A witness, Robert Carmody Pollei, called by plain-
tiff testified (71, 72) and defendant acknowledged ( 119) 
that on one occasion defendant kissed and hugged a Jackie 
Bigler. Mr. Pollei didn't know whether this occurred be-
fore or after May 10, 1962 ( 79) · This divorce action was 
commenced May 10, 1962 ( 1 ) . Defendant testified that 
said incident occurred the last part of May, after the com-
mencement of this action (99), and that he did no dating 
until after the commencement of this action (99, 135). 
Mr. Pollei further testified that at about the same time, 
defendant kept company with Jackie Bigler at an art 
party ( 73) and that he wrestled with her ( 75) ~ Mr. 
Pollei didn't know whether this art party was before or 
after the complaint was filed ( 7 4) . Mr. Pollei also testi-
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fied that he saw defendant and said Jackie Bigler together 
in the absence of plaintiff in a social event perhaps 10 
times ( 76). Mr. Pollei did not testify as to the dates of 
these occurrences. Defendant testified that he had told 
his friends, in the presence of plaintiff, that the child they 
were expecting was a mistake ( 114) . Defendant stated 
that at the aforesaid art party his head had been on the 
knee of said Jackie Bigler ( 118) . Defendant admitted that 
he had been with said Jackie Bigler socially about three 
times ( 118), but that he had only dated after the com-
mencement of this action ( 135) . 
Defendant testified that just prior to the marriage of 
the parties they made plans that defendant should con-
tinue his schooling without holding a job ( 88) . This ar-
rangement was also testified to by defendant's mother 
( 13 7 ) , and plaintiff testified she planned to work while 
defendant finished his education (58)· Defendant fur-
ther testified that after marriage, to his surprise, plaintiff 
insisted about one month after the marriage that defen-
dant take a job ( 88). Defendant also testified that the 
parties were never able to agree on the subject of de-
fendant working in addition to going to school (90), and 
that it resulted in numerous arguments (90). That as a 
result of their arguments defendant built up resentment 
( 90) , and defendant no longer desired the companion-
ship of plaintiff ( 90) . Defendant testified there was too 
much friction between the parties and that he could not 
adjust to the friction and arguments, that defendant de-
veloped quite a serious case of ulcers due to the nervous 
tension he was under (91). That the situation was a great 
mental strain on defendant ( 91 ) , and that as a result de-
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fendant could no longer contribute his entire self to his 
work and that a great deal of his problem was nervous-
ness (91). Defendant's attorney asked defendant, "Any 
other manifestations along those lines? Do you recall any-
thing further?" Defendant answered "No." (91). There-
upon defendant's attorney asked defendant, "Did you 
suffer sleeplessness?" Plaintiff objected to that question as 
being leading and the court sustained the objection (92). 
Defendant testified that he was under pressure in school 
to put in more time ( 94), that plaintiff felt that he was 
putting in too much time ( 94, 95), that discussion of the 
subject resulted in argument and that defendant be-
came very non-productive because of them (95), that 
the parties were not in accord on social activities in con-
nection with the Art Club of which defendant was Vice 
Prresident ( 95) and that as a result plaintiff and defen-
dant became more and more estranged (96). Defendant 
testified that during the marriage from about February to 
June of 1962 he consulted a psychiatrist because of men-
tal stress and his relationship with his wife (97). 
Plaintiff and defendant's mother testified that de-
fendant had been fun-loving (57, 137), and plaintiff tes-
tified that towards the end of the marriage defendant was 
not emotionally stable and in control of himself (59) . 
Plaintiff testified that it was important to her in selecting 
a husband to have one financially stable (58). Plaintiff 
testified that she tried "very hard" to get defendant to 
change some of his ways (63) and defendant's mother tes-
tified that plaintiff had told her she married defendant 
because she thought she could change him ( 137). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1· THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT 
SUPPORT THE FOLLOWING PORTION OF THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING NUMBER 4, TO-WIT: 
"ON OR ABOUT THE 29TH DAY OF APRIL, 1962, 
AND PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT THERETO, DE-
FENDANT TREATED PLAINTIFF CRUELLY, 
CAUSING HER GREAT MENTAL DISTRESS," 
AND THEREFORE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF A DIVORCE ON HER 
COMPLAINT. 
Sec. 30-3-1, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, provides for 
divorce for various causes. Among other things it permits, 
in subsection ( 7) , a divorce for "Cruel treatment of the 
plaintiff by the defendant to the extent of causing ... 
great mental distress to the plaintiff." This is the ground 
upon which plaintiff attempts to obtain a divorce in this 
case. In order to obtain a divorce under said section, plain-
tiff must prove two things, to-wit: ( 1) cruel treatment 
of plaintiff by defendant, and (2) that such cruel treat-
ment caused great mental distress to plaintiff. This dis-
tinction appears to have been clearly recognized in the 
case of Stevenson v. Stevenson, 13 Utah 2d 153, 369 P. 
2d 923 ( 1962). 
It thus appears that the law imposes an objective 
standard and a subjective standard. The determination 
of what constitutes cruelty will be objectively determined; 
the court will determine whether certain conduct is cruel 
' although this determination must always be made in the 
light of the particular facts. A given act may be cruel 
in one set of circumstances and not at all cruel in another. 
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Nonetheless, it is an objective determination. On the 
other hand the law requires that the cruel act, be it ever 
so cruel, must have a certain effect upon the plaintiff-
it must cause great mental distress. This is subjective in 
its nature. The effect of given conduct will vary greatly 
from person to person. See Stevenson v. Stevenson, supra. 
It is undoubtedly true that cruel treament will not be 
appreciated by anyone. This the law could safely assume, 
and a court might be justified in implying or assuming 
in every case where it found cruelty that the plaintiff did 
not like it. But simply not liking certain cruel conduct does 
not mean that it causes great mental distress, and the 
court cannot assume that it does. Whether certain con-
duct has cause great mental distress is a question of fact 
which must be proved. 
In the present case the evidence does not disclose that 
plaintiff suffered great mental distress as the result of 
any cruelty on the part of defendant. 
The only evidence of plaintiff's reaction to any con-
duct of defendant is found in her testimony in the follow-
ing instances: 
( 1 ) At page 34 of the record, plaintiff was asked, 
"Now, Mrs· Melville, you have alleged that on or about 
the 29th day of April, 1962, and prior and. subsequent 
thereto, that the defendant has treated you cruelly, caus-
ing you great mental distress?" Plaintiff answered, "Yes." 
Thus plaintiff has merely affirmed that she made certain 
allegations. She did not testify that defendant's treatment 
did in fact cause her great mental distress. Further, plain-
tiff's complaint is not verified by her oath, so we don't 
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even have the allegation under oath. Plaintiff has merely 
stated under oath that she made an allegation. This is 
not evidence of great mental distress. Alleging is one 
thing, proving another. Even if the complaint had been 
verified, any statement therein contained would not be 
evidence upon which the court could base a finding of 
great mental distress. Sec. 30-3-4 U.C.A. 1953, as amend-
ed, provides in part : 
" . . · No decree of divorce shall be granted upon 
default, or otherwise, except upon legal evidence 
taken in the cause ... " 
The holding of this court in the case of Treutle v. 
District Court of Salt Lake County, 7 Utah 2d 155, 320 
P. 2d 666 ( 1958) would seem to give support to the view 
that an allegation in a complaint is not evidence. 
( 2) At page 34 of the record plaintiff was asked, 
"What are the circumstances that brought about this 
charge?" This was followed by plaintiff's testimony with 
regard to various matters. Here again, testimony concern-
ing circumstances that brought about a charge is not 
proof of great mental distress to plaintiff. 
( 3) At page 36 of the record plaintiff testified that 
the parties did not live in happiness and peace during the 
first year of their marriage. That the parties were not 
happy or at peace is not proof of great mental distress. 
When a divorce can be granted because parties are not 
happy or at peace then as a practical matter anyone can 
get a divorce at about any time. 
( 4) At pages 36 and 3 7 of the record plaintiff testi-
fied that it bothered her very much that defendant started 
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smoking several months after marriage and that defen-
dant commenced to drink alcoholic beverages· Being 
"bothered very much" is certainly not the equivalent of 
great mental distress. Even if it were, it is submitted that 
smoking and drinking do not constitute cruelty in the first 
place, especially in view of the fact that plaintiff had 
done some smoking and drinking herself. 
( 5) Finally, at page 42 of the record plaintiff tes-
tified that finding out that defendant had a reputation 
for being flirtatious caused her very much mental con-
cern, that it caused her anguish and that it caused her 
embarrassment among her friends. It is conceded that 
this is probably the equivalent of great mental distress, 
but it is submitted that having a reputation of being flir-
tatious is not cruelty. Being flirtatious might be cruel, but 
having a reputation isn't cruel. Having a reputation isn't 
even an act, it doesn't constitute conduct on the part of 
defendant. It is something over which defendant may 
have no control. Had plaintiff proved that defendant was 
flirtatious and had she then testified that this caused her 
great mental distress, we would have a different situa-
tion. Further it is submitted that the court erred in allow-
ing testimony as to reputation. This is discussed as Point 
4 of the Argument herein. Even if testimony as to repu-
tation is proper, it should only go to corroborate actual 
testimony of the particular cruel act. It is the act which 
must be cruel, not the reputation, and it is the act which 
must cause great mental distress, not the reputation. In 
this case there is no testimony that plaintiff suffered great 
mental distress because defendant was flirtatious· 
It is submitted that plaintiff did not prove that any 
conduct of defendant caused her great mental distress. 
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POINT 2. THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY PRE-
PONDERATES AGAINST THE FINDING OF THE 
TRIAL COURT THAT: "DEFENDANT SHOULD 
BE DENIED ANY RECOURSE BY VIRTUE OF HIS 
COUNTERCLAIM." AND THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT A 
DIVORCE UPON HIS COUNTERCLAIM AND IN 
HAVING DISMISSED SAID COUNTERCLAIM. 
SUCH ACTION IS PLAINLY AN ABUSE OF DIS-
CRETION. AND IS MANIFESTLY UNJUST AND 
INEQUITABLE. 
As discussed in Point 1 of this argument, plaintiff 
failed to establish grounds for divorce. It is submitted that 
defendant clearly established grounds. The substance of 
defendant's testimony was that plaintiff's failure almost 
immediately after their marriage and long before the 
child entered the picture, to abide by the original agree-
ment of the parties that plaintiff would work while de-
fendant went to school, resulted in arguments between 
the parties. 
This certainly constitutes cruelty, especially when 
viewed in light of plaintiff's admission as to the impor-
tance of finances to her. There is ample testimony that 
this caused defendant great mental distress. 
There can be little doubt that this marriage should 
be dissolved. Defendant's physical and mental health are 
at stake. It appears that the parties are unsuited for each 
other. Finances are important to plaintiff. She has a good 
job in a stable profession· She belonged to a sorority in 
college and during the marriage belonged to a bridge club. 
The secure life seems to be very important to plaintiff. 
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On the other hand defendant is an artist, and every indi-
cation is that financial matters do not have the same im-
portance for him. 
This court has held in effect that when it is evident 
that no good purpose can be served by compelling the 
parties to remain together a divorce should be granted, 
assuming of course that proper grounds have been estab-
lished. See Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P. 2d 
977 (1956). 
This is such a case. Defendant has established 
grounds and plaintiff has not; the divorce should have 
been awarded to defendant on his counterclaim. 
POINT 3. THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY PRE-
PONDERATES AGAINST THE FINDINGS OF THE 
TRIAL COURT; THAT A REASONABLE AMOUNT 
TO BE AWARDED PLAINTIFF AS ALIMONY IS 
$50 PER MONTH, THAT IT IS REASONABLE 
THAT THE MERCEDES AUTOMOBILE, THE 
FURNITURE AND HOUSEHOLD FURNISHINGS 
(EXCEPT ONE RECORD CABINET, ONE 36-PIECE 
CRYSTAL SET, AND DEFENDANT'S PERSONAL 
WEARING APPAREL) ,BE AWARDED TO PLAIN::, 
TIFF, THAT IT IS REASONABLE THAT PLAIN-
TIFF BE AWARDED $400 ATTORNEY FEES. THAT 
THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ABUSED ITS DIS-
CRETION IN ENTERING JUDGMENT IN AC-
CORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING FINDINGS, 
AND SUCH JUDGMENT IS MANIFESTLY UN-
JUST AND INEQUITABLE. 
In order to determine whether a divorce decree is 
inequitable, it must be viewed in its entirety, and thus 
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although viewed alone some parts of the decree are prop-
er, appeal is taken from the entire decree. This view 
seems to be supported by the case of Graziano v. Grazi-
ano, 7 Utah 2d 187, 321 P· 2d 931 (1958) where the 
court held in effect that an atatck on a divorce decree is 
regarded as an attack upon the whole decree. 
Defendant concedes that it was proper to grant cus-
tody of the child of the parties to plaintiff, subject to rea-
sonable rights of visitation in defendant and to award 
plaintiff $50 per month child support money and a judg-
ment for arrears under order pendente lite for $597.75, 
and to order defendant to pay said bills in the sum of 
$79.49. Defendant submits however that this must be 
taken into consideration in determining whether the rest 
of the decree is inequitable as claimed by defendant. 
In the case of Wilson v. Wilson, supra, this court 
set forth the matters, to be considered in adjusting the 
"economic resources" of the parties; it was there said at 
page 82: 
"When it appeared that the purposes of matri-
mony had been destroyed to the extent that fur-
ther living together was intolerable, it was in ac-
cordance with the court's duty and perogative to 
grant plaintiff a divorce. In doing so it is desir-
able to avoid perpetuation of the difficulties that 
brought failure to the marriage. The object to be 
desired is to minimize animosities and to 'let the 
dead past bury its dead' insofar as that is possible. 
The court's responsibility is to endeavor to provide 
a just and equitable adiustment of their economic 
resources so that the parties can reconstruct their 
lives on a happy and useful basis. In doing so it is 
necessary for the court to consider, in addition to 
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the relative guilt or innocence of the parties, an 
appraisal of all of the attendant facts and circum-
stances: the duration of the marriage; the ages of 
the parties; their social positions and standards of 
living; their health; considerations relative to chil-
dren; the money and property they possess and 
how it was acquired; their capabilities and train-
ing and their present and potential incomes." 
Viewing this case in the light of the foregoing quo-
tation: 
RELATIVE GUILT. It appears that in all justice 
relative guilt or innocence should play a minor role in this 
case. Only defendant has proved grounds for divorce, but 
as in most cases there are things to be said in favor of each 
party as well as against each party. Although the parties 
are both young in this case and the marriage a short one, 
ill health (including mental health) appears to have 
played a very large part in the difficulties between these 
parties and the following statement in the case of Mar-
tinett v· Martinett, 8 Utah 2d 202, 331 P. 2d 821 (1958), 
at page 204 should also apply here: 
"In a case such as this, where the parties have 
spent substantially their adult lives together, and 
the trouble between them has seemed to come 
largely from inability to make adjustments to ill 
health and advancing years, the matter of con-
sidering relative guilt or innocence in bringing 
about the divorce was properly considered by the 
trial court as minimal insofar as bearing on their 
property rights." 
DURATION OF MARRIAGE AND AGE OF 
PAR TIES. Plaintiff was 26 years old at the trial. The 
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parties had been married less than a year and nine 
months at the time ·they· separated. This is not a case 
where plaintiff has given away the best years of her life. 
What has plaintiff lost by the marriage? She increased 
her professional skills and she has a child - both are 
gains to plaintiff. She has had an unfortunate exper-
ience, perhaps. In the case of Foreman v. Foreman, 111 
Utah 72, 176 P. 2d 144 ( 1946) at page 88 this court 
clearly said "heart balm" is not an issue in a divorce 
case: 
"It would seem from a reading of the above 
statements that what the court was attempting to 
do here was compensate Mrs. Foreman for her 
suffering of the pangs of unrequited love- heart 
balm- and teach Mr. Foreman a lesson in mar-
riage. Neither task is properly within the issues of 
a divorce case such as this." 
It is grossly inequitable to award permanent ali-
mony in this case where the parties were married for such 
a short time, and plaintiff's condition has not materially 
changed. Plaintiff is 26 years old.' If defendant pays 
her $50 per month alimony until she is even 70 years old, 
he will have been required to pay her about $26,000, 
and this after less than 2 years of marriage while living 
together. It is true the plaintiff may remarry, but she 
may not. 
SOCIAL POSITION AND STANDARD OF LIV-
ING. Plaintiff was a college graduate before the mar-
riage, and during the marriage she increased her skills 
and became a librarian. Plaintiff's beginning salary as 
a teacher was $3600 per year; it is now $4200 or more 
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per year~ The general, tenor of .her testimony was that 
defendant was not much help financially during the mar-
riage. It clearly appears that her standard of living won't 
be hurt by this divorce. In fact she will not have to help 
defendant with his schooling. 
HEALTH. It clearly appears that defendant does 
not have good physical health. He testified that he had 
ulcers and other physical problems. In addition, he has 
emotional problems severe enough toward the end of the 
marriage to . require psychiatric treatment. The court 
should be especially careful not to impose undue hardship 
upon defendant in such a case. 
CHILDREN· The parties have one child. It is prop-
er that plaintiff have custody, and that defendant pay 
plaintiff $50 per month for the support of the child. This 
of course means an extra financial responsibility upon 
defendant which must be considered. 
POSSESSIONS AND HOW ACQUIRED. The 
parties had property worth about $3131. Much of the 
property was received as gifts. The court a warded prop-
erty worth $86 to defendant. The circumstances of this 
case cannot justify such a one-sided award. Defendant 
asked for property worth $941 (of which the largest item 
was a bedroom set worth $600, which was gift from de-
fendant's parents) plus a one-half interest in the $600 
automobile. Thus plaintiff asked for property worth about 
$1241 -far less than one-half of the property of the par-
ties. Of course the Mercedes would have to be sold, but 
it would permit each to get a start in purchasing another 
car, and defendant testified that he needed a car. 
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TRAINING AND INCOME. The testimony dis-
closes that plaintiff has a good job in a stable profession 
- a school librarian - and that defendant hasn't even 
completed his schooling. Plaintiff's net pay is $288 per 
month. Defendant testified that his net pay was $250 
per month· 
The expenses of plaintiff and the child total $340 per 
month - which includes $30 for miscellaneous items in-
cluding entertainment. Defendant's expenses are $202.10 
per month. After defendant pays plaintiff $50 per month 
child support plaintiff would have $338 per month which 
is essentially what she testified she needed including en-
tertainment. On the other hand defendant would have 
only $200 left which is less than, but essentially, what he 
testified his expenses were without entertainment. If in 
addition, plaintiff received $50 per month alimony, plain-
tiff will have an unwarranted windfall of $50, and de-
fendant will have $50 less than he needs. The circum-
stances of this case do not justify alimony. 
In making such an award the trial court was per-
haps influenced by the testimony regarding defendant's 
dating after the divorce action was commenced. This 
court in the case of Vrontikis v. Vrontikis, 11 Utah 2d 
305, 358 P. 2d 632 (1961), held at page 306: 
"Evidence as to conduct subsequent to the 
filing of a divorce complaint is inadmissable 
for the purpose of establishing grounds for 
divorce, but it admissable as lending weight to 
and corroborating testimony as to prior acts of ill 
treatment." 
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Thus such testimony can only assist the court in de-
termining whether it will believe testimony of prior acts 
-it does not change the nature of any such prior act. 
The court may also have been influenced by the de-
fendant's statement that the child was a mistake. This 
undoubtedly meant unexpected· In any case, it is not 
a ground for divorce, because it was brought out after 
plaintiff had finished testifying, and there is no evidence 
at all that it caused plaintiff great mental distress. The 
child may well have been unexpected by plaintiff also. 
The only explanation for such an award of alimony in 
this case is that it is punitive. This court however in the 
case of Wilson v. Wilson, supra, stated at page 82 that 
it is improper to administer "punitive measures in a di-
vorce judgment." 
In cases where the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the findings of the trial court, or where there has 
been plain abuse of discretion, or where a manifest in-
justice or inequity is wrought this court can and should 
change the judgment of the trial court. See Curry v. Cur-
ry, 7 Utah 2d 198, 321 P. 2d 939 ( 1958). This is clearly 
such a case. In view of the foregoing, plaintiff should not 
be awarded any alimony; defendant should be awarded 
the property sought by him or its equivalent in value; and 
finally, defendant should not be required to pay $400 
attorney fees in view of the fact that the evidence shows 
that plaintiff earns more than defendant and because the 
divorce should be awarded to defendant. 
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POINT 4~ THE TRIAL COURT· ERRED IN 
OVERRPLING DEFENDAN·T:'S OBJECTIONS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE .. 
At the trial (Record page, 41 ) plaintiff was allowed 
to introduce testimony as to defendant's reputation for 
being flirtatious over defendant's objection that such tes-
timony was immaterial and improper. Such testimony 
is of course hearsay and thus incompetent and improper. 
Further, it is immaterial and irrelevant what defendant's 
reputation is. The issue in this case is what defendant did 
or did_ not do -not ~hat his ~eputation is. In 17 .Am. 
Jur. Divorce, Sec. 408, _it is said in connection with di-
vorce on grounds of ad~ltery: . · 
" ... it is well recognized that the character of the 
wife for chastity is not in issue so as to render ad-
missible against her, in the first instance, evidence 
of her reputation for unchastity.'~ 
Although we are not here dealing with adultery 
grounds, the same rule should apply. In addition, there-
putation testified to was not even a general one, but rather 
appears to deal with defendant's reputation among plain-
tiff's friends. The admission of such testimony of reputa-
tion constitutes prejudicial error. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, thej udgment of the trial 
court should be reversed, and defendant should be award-
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ed a divorce on his counterclaim and the other relief 
sought by defendant on this appeal as hereinbefore set 
out. 
Respectfully submitted, 
William G. Shelton and 
Robert C· Cummings 
705 Utah Savings Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant 
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